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Historical Developments. According to Marco Polo, the Assassins, who belonged to the
schismatic sect of 1L] U ￿,VP ¶ OLWHV￿￿ZRXOG￿GUXJ￿WKHPVHOYHV￿LQWR￿D￿UHOLJLRXV￿IHUYRU￿WR￿JHW
a foretaste of eternal bliss before setting out to kill or conquer (S1). But no corroborating
evidence from Middle Eastern sources exists for such hashish rituals. From the fortress of
0DV\ I￿LQ￿WKH￿$Q￿1XVD\U \DK￿PRXQWDLQV￿￿5DVK G￿DG￿’ LQ￿DV￿6LQ Q￿DQG￿KLV￿VXFFHVVRUV￿
known as Shaykh al-djebel (which the Crusaders rendered as “Old Man of the
Mountain”), instituted a strategy of political wreckage and intimidation to undermine
Sunni dominance in the region. Charismatic leaders ceremoniously passed on the ritual
dagger to young men for use in suicide assassination. Victims included caliphs, sultans,
emirs, vizirs, qadis (judges), and so on.
There are historical parallels with today’s Islamic radicals in terms of top-down
organizational planning and discipline, and a millenarian belief in creation of a just
religious society by means of sacrificial violence. Although the Assassins did not refrain
from attacking Europeans, coreligionists were their primary victims. The anti-Western
tenor of current radical Islamists echoes more the liberation ideology of juramentado
(Spanish for “having sworn an oath”), which involved suicide attacks by small, diffusely
organized groups of Philippine Moslems against colonizing Spaniards and other
Christians (16th to 20th centuries) (S2).
The first use of terror as a political concept during the French Revolution was
primarily the inspiration of lawyers, mid-level civil servants, and other educated
professionals. Intellectuals among later-day violent revolutionaries (nihilists, bolshevists,
facists, and ethnic or religious supremacists) have also been the chief proponents of terror
to disorient, demoralize, and destroy the enemy. They also occasionally resorted to using
suicide attackers when circumstances permitted. Nothing indicates that the attackers
themselves were ignorant or impoverished (e.g., Russian anarchist bombers, Japanese
kamikaze).
Between 1983 and 1999, there were some 50 suicide attacks in Lebanon, about half of
which were attributed to the Moslem Shi’ite organizations, Hezbollah and Amal. The
other half was the work of secular nationalist parties (Syrian Nationalist Party, Lebanese
Communist Party, Lebanese Ba’ath Party), who soon recognized the effectiveness of
Hezbollah’s pioneering tactics. After the Israeli Air Force killed Hezbollah secretary
general Abas Musavi in February 1992, Hezbollah went “international” a month later
with a suicide attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (29 killed, 250
wounded). Nevertheless, having obtained its key political objectives in Lebanon,
Hezbollah had dramatically lessened its strategic reliance on suicide bombing by 1992,
when it decided to participate in parliamentary elections and become a “mainstream”
political party. Lebanon’s other martyrdom-sponsoring organizations joined suit.
Hezbollah’s tactics also inspired Valupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic leader of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to form a cadre of suicide bombers (the Black
Tigers) who do not “kill themselves” (thatkolai) but rather “give themselves” (thatkodai)
to him and the cause (S3). Since 1983, the LTTE has spearheaded the Tamil insurgency
against Sri Lanka’s government. The LTTE’s aim is both to eliminate the ruling elite ofAtran SOM, p. 2
Sri Lanka and to terrify the majority Sinhalese population into abandoning the
government. Between 1987 and 2000, the Black Tigers carried out 168 attacks in Sri
Lanka and India (about half of the world’s suicide actions). Its victims include two Sri
Lankan Presidents (one killed, one blinded), a Minister of Defense, a Navy Chief,
assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and a host of moderate Tamil leaders.
The LTTE’s innovations include frequent use of female bombers and occasionally
children (less likely than adult males to be searched), teams of multiple attackers
(equipped with cyanide capsules to ensure no surviving sources of information), boat
attacks (and a special squad of Sea Tigers), specialized body suits, an explosives research
unit (testing for maximum damage at minimal cost and likelihood of detection), and a far-
ranging international propaganda and procurement network. As with other successful
martyr-sponsoring groups, there are apparently many more applicants than jobs, which
allows better selection of candidates for martyrdom. The LTTE has successfully wrested
control of Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern coastal areas, where it has recently suspended
suicide actions and allowed in visitors.
Hamas and PIJ initially focused suicide attacks on military installations in the occupied
territories but soon shifted to Israel’s cities and crowded areas to undermine civilian
support for the Israeli government’s occupation of Palestinian territories (Hamas and PIJ
are publicly ambiguous about whether “Zionist occupation” refers to all of historic
Palestine, including Israel itself, or only the West Bank and Gaza) (S4). Although there
have been lulls in suicide actions, targeted assassinations of Hamas and PIJ organizers by
Israeli intelligence even during lulls stimulated renewed attacks (e.g., after the January
1996 assassination of master bomber Yahya Ayyash). Recently, a radical wing of Fatah,
The Palestinian Liberation Movement’s dominant secular and nationalist faction, has also
sponsored suicide attacks. Unlike Islamic groups, which generally disallow use of
women, children, married men, or the elderly, Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades allow
all to become martyrs (shohada). As the overwhelming majority of Palestinians express
religious beliefs, these rewards also include direct access to paradise.
The Middle East and North Africa are home to several other groups that sponsor
suicide terrorism: Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Islamic Group of Egypt (Gamaya
Islamiya, IG), Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), and the Marxist-Leninist
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). The Islamic groups all have ties to Al-Qaida. The PKK
ceased suicide operations in 1999, after its captured leader, Abdullah Ocalan, called for
cessation (Turkey subsequently opted not to execute Ocalan). The PKK has not attacked
foreign interests, as have the secular groups of Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, and Sri Lanka.
Since 9/11, a number of Islamic groups in Central and Southeast Asia now sponsor or
give logistical support to martyr actions. These include Chechen militants (acting mainly
against Russian targets), Pakistan’s Harkat Al-Mujahedin (formerly Harkat Al-Ansar),
Bangladesh’s Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Singapore’s Jemaah Islamiyah
(“Islamic Community,” JI), Malaysia’s Al-Ma’unah (“Brotherhood of Inner Power”) and
Kumpulan Militan (KMM), Indonesia’s Laskar Jihad (“Army of Jihad”) and Majelis
Mujahedin (“Holy Warriors’ Council,” MMI), and the Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf Group.
All of these organizations have substantiated ties to Al-Qaida (S5).Atran SOM, p. 3
Many of the regional groups have long-standing militant credentials. JI, KMM, and
MMI trace their origins to Darul Islam (“House of Islam”), a revolutionary group that
emerged in the 1940s to fight Dutch rule in Indonesia. EIJ, IG, and GIA have roots in
pre-existing associations of the “Muslim Brotherhood” (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun), a
paramilitary religious organization founded in Egypt in 1928 with branches throughout
North Africa and the Middle East (S6). Increasingly, Al-Qaida has been able to co-opt
militant Islam’s locally deep historical foundations into a global network of fluid but
pervasive ties (S7) that support the truly radical goal of supplanting Western dominance
with
 a worldwide Islamic Caliphate.
Through the Taliban, Al-Qaida availed itself of Islamic state terrorism to repress or kill
politico-religious nonconformists within its central sphere of influence. As with Iran’s
similar, if somewhat less virulent, form of state terrorism, the symbolic focus of
repression was on women’s status, where every appearance and activity outside the
household must be strictly controlled lest the core bond of Moslem society—the family—
come unglued. As have the Algerian GIA and Egyptian EIJ, Al-Qaida’s state terrorism
has also ruthlessly sought to extirpate civic (nonreligious and voluntary) influences from
the body politic while encouraging other aspects of secular (e.g., scientific and technical)
reforms deemed useful for the battles to come. But it is in the offensive against infidels—
Christians, Jews and the states that support them, particularly the USA and Israel—that
Al-Qaida’s strategy and tactics are revolutionary. Unlike its regional allies, Al-Qaida
does not consider its first and primary target to be the less-than-true believers within
Islamic countries, but infidels without whose support heresy, blasphemy, apostasy,
infidelity, atheism, and political and economic “enslavement” (S8) would presumably not
even be conceivable.
Al Qaida’s declared aim in this offensive is to use spectacular, seemingly
indiscriminate, displays of violent self-sacrifice to demoralize the enemy’s noncombatant
population so as to sap popular support for the enemy’s will to resist the agenda of the
organization sponsoring the attack. This agenda includes immediate evacuation of
Western interests from countries with large Moslem populations and acceptance of an
Islamic Caliphate over all Moslems (including in countries with Moslem minorities) (S9):
“The Caliphate is the only and best solution to the predicaments and problems from
which Muslims suffer today…. It will remedy economic underdevelopment which was
bequeathed upon us as a political independence on an atheist East and infidel West.”
(S10). Al-Qaida’s brand of suicide mass terrorism is a fairly novel form of psychological
warfare, using its opponents’ strengths to its own advantage. An attack operates on the
assumption that the more efficient and global the media, the more powerful and
widespread its effects.
Radical Islamic Fundamentalism—An Oxymoron. Unlike people in Western Christian
societies, Arabic, Ottoman, and Persian Moslem communities never entertained notions
of a church different or separate from state or nation until Kemal Atäturk established the
Republic of Turkey in 1923. Christians early on accepted a separation of church and state
as a matter of cultural survival (“Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are
Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.” Matthew 22:21). Once Christianity
became the religion of empires and kingdoms, relations between church and state wereAtran SOM, p. 4
often conflicting and intermittently blurred. Nevertheless, these two distinct bodies of
powers and functions endured through all of Western Christendom. Beginning with the
Peace of Westphalia at the end of Europe’s religious Thirty Years War, spurred along by
the nonreligious American Revolution and the antireligious French Revolution, and
culminating with the advent of the European Union after World War II, Western Europe
and some former colonies finally opted for a full constitutional divorce between church
and state (albeit with some apparent backsliding now occurring in the United States).
This would hopefully forestall the hitherto relentless bloodshed among competing
religious communities and allow for a constitutionally sanctioned degree of political and
religious pluralism needed to sustain economic productivity, social peace, and individual
welfare.
In contrast, the very idea of conflict or struggle between religious ministration, on the
one hand, and political, economic, and social administration, on the other hand, was
wholly alien to Moslem civilization ever since Mohammed successfully fused all these
functions in the Nation of Islam. Like Judaism, but unlike Christianity, war-making
powers have been scripturally invested with leaders of the religious community since
ancient times (S11). Unlike Christianity before modern times, Islam tolerated other
religions in its midst, particularly Christianity and Judaism, even allowing their adherents
to reach the highest political offices under ultimate (sometimes merely titular) Moslem
suzerainty. Only with the collapse of post-colonial Moslem regimes that were caricatures
of Western secular ideologies (national militarism, communism, socialism, or
constitutional monarchy), has the idea and policy emerged of religious believers seizing
control of the state apparatus by repressing or annihilating nonconformists from within
and blocking entry or killing infidels from without.
Contrary Academic Explanations. Scholarly explanations of the genesis of suicide
terrorism have tended toward rather simplistic reductions to some essential cause or
factor. Some of these elements have been more important than others, depending on time
and place. All are also characteristic of phenomena other than suicide terrorism. None
alone are sufficient to explain its genesis. Given the fact that its spread across minds and
populations now depends critically on global media, calling for often immediate
reactions, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism is almost guaranteed to “mutate” in
structure, capability, and operation at a spiraling rate that may be approaching that of a
biological or ideational retrovirus, such as AIDS or computer worms. Consider the
following:
At first, when Hezbollah’s connections to Iran were obvious, analysts sought to explain
the genesis of suicide terrorism as a “state-sponsored” activity. Daniel Pipes, Director of
the Middle East Forum and an advisor to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense,
concluded that: “Governments, not individuals willing to die, make this a potent force.
Without state support, suicide acts would be infrequent and ineffectual.” (S12).
Individuals who participate in suicide attacks might themselves be victims of “blackmail”
and “unwilling suicide.” Adequate defense would thus be straightforward: make
unbearable the costs to states that sponsor terror.
According to the Federation of American Scientists, however, even Hezbollah “may
have conducted operations that were not approved by Iran.” (S13). Although otherAtran SOM, p. 5
terrorist organizations have entered into relationships with governments, there is no
evidence that such relationships were ever proprietary or exclusive; they have often been
changing and volatile (e.g., relations of Lebanese and Palestinian groups with Syria, Iran,
and Iraq). Moreover, all polls of populations supporting suicide attacks, and nearly all
interrogations of captured suicide operatives, indicate that those who choose martyrdom
do so as willing volunteers.
Many of the arguments used to demonstrate state sponsorship of suicide terrorism have
since proved specious: the organization’s shadowy nature (hence, a front for something
more substantial), the careful planning involved (requiring sophisticated state-level
intelligence services), the innovative use of personnel, explosives, and other weapons
(requiring state-level financing and logistics), and so forth. Many of these same
arguments are now used to demonstrate the contrary, namely, that shadowy, mobile,
flexible, innovative organizations could not possibly be sponsored by top-heavy state
bureaucracies. Some analysts even surmise that suicide terrorism thrives only in anarchy.
For example, Shibley Telhami, Professor of Government at the University of Maryland
and a Brookings Institute Fellow, states: “The absence of effective government is their
primary source of power. They are antigovernment.” (S14). Support for this view comes
from the recent rise of a stateless, multinational Al-Qaida, concurrent with the
disintegration of the Palestinian Authority and its ability to control new waves of suicide
bombings. Nevertheless, governments have sponsored, aided, and abetted suicide
terrorism in the past and will likely do so in the future.
Other scenarios locate the essence of suicide terrorism in the individual’s irrational
pathology or reasonable coping mechanisms. Much of the early research on terrorism,
especially in the psychological literature, instructed that the causes of terrorism “must be
sought in the psychopathology of the assassin.” (S15). Popular media images of crazed,
lone gunmen blowing their brains out after a killing spree encouraged public support for
this approach. According to Israeli psychologist Ariel Merari: (S16) “Culture in general,
and religion in particular, seem to be relatively unimportant in the phenomenon of
terrorist suicide. Terrorist suicide, like any other suicide, is basically an individual rather
than a group phenomenon: it is done by people who wish to die for personal reasons.”
(S17). For Rafi Israeli, a Professor at the Hebrew University’s Truman Institute for Peace,
suicide bombers are low-esteem sufferers who have emerged from broken families (S18).
Psychologist Andrew Silke, however, notes that it is rare to find hard evidence of a
terrorist who suffers from personality disorders or who could be classified as mentally ill
or psychologically deviant. Silke argues that becoming a terrorist is primarily a product
of individual socialization. Socially disaffected persons become terrorists when they
encounter a precipitating event, such as “extreme physical violence committed by the
police or security forces or other rival group against the individual, friends or simply
anyone they can identify with.” (S19). In a similar vein, Palestinian psychiatrist Eyad
Sarraj, Director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Program, holds that suicide
terrorism stems from despair and trauma at being constantly humiliated and subject to
violence (both by Israel and the Palestinian authority): “Do you know what it means for a
child to see his father spat at and beaten before his eyes?” (S20)Atran SOM, p. 6
The Role of Religion. For Merari, (S21) who has reversed his earlier position and now
holds that suicide terrorism can only be properly fathomed at the organizational and not
individual level, (S22) religion is only one of a number of possible organizational
mechanisms for establishing a contract binding the individual to his group commitment.
The example of nonreligious suicide bombers in Lebanon and Sri Lanka would seem to
drive home the point. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider ostensibly nonreligious
commitments to transhistorical ethno-nationalist agendas, personality cults, and
axiomatic Marxist-Leninist principles as examples of (quasi-) religious belief defined as
follows: (i) (materially) costly, and (ii) sincere (emotionally hard-to-fake) commitment to
(iii) a preposterously counterfactual world (of supernatural or transcendent causes that are
impossible to verify or falsify by logical or empirical means) (S23). The greater the
material sacrifice (e.g., killing of self or a loved one) to an apparently absurd truth
(instant violent death becoming an eternally pleasurable life in paradise, surviving one’s
death by making it a living part of ineluctable historical or national consciousness), the
more one is able to convince oneself, and thus others, of the selfless truth of one’s cause.
Because the worth of this commitment to a factually preposterous world cannot be
empirically or logically validated, it is validated only through emotional communion with
fellow believers in public ceremonies. This ceremonial communion always involves the
affective coordination of body states among members of the congregation (through song,
chant, incantation, dance, sway, marching, etc.). Even the Taliban and Al-Qaida promote
ritual use of a cappella chants. Ritual communion often includes typical primate gestures
of submission and trust (kneeling, bowing, prostrating, baring throat and chest, etc.) as
well as courtship (routinized, formulaic patterning of ritual) and bonding (cooing,
hugging, kissing, etc.) (S23).
In the case of Al Qaida and the Taliban, early religious indoctrination appears to be
significant for proactive martyrdom. Prolonged humiliation and precipitating events are
not evident factors. “Jihad” was often the first word children learn to spell in Taliban
religious schools (madrasa). Taught as “God’s path to paradise,” the idea matures if need
be into war unto death, as in the following Harakat (Pakistani-based Al-Qaida ally) Oath
to Jihad (bayt al-ridwan): “I, Amir Maawia Siddiqi, son of Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, state
in the presence of God that I will slaughter infidels my entire life.” (S10). Palestinian
suicide terrorists become “living martyrs” the moment they reaffirm the bayt al-ridwan in
video testaments of their willingness to die so long as enemies live (S24).
Such sentiments are characteristic of apparently arational, emotionally driven
commitments, including heartfelt romantic love and uncontrollable vengeance (S25).
They may have emerged under natural selection’s influence, to override rational
calculations based on seemingly impossible or very long odds of achieving individual
goals, such as lasting security (S26). Although these sentiments seem to lack rationality
in the short term (i.e., in the rational-choice sense of maximizing known or anticipated
utility), they may be eminently rational as evolutionary strategies that refine the reward
mechanism for pursuing individual self-interest by enhancing long-term benefits for
members of a population on average. Provided that actual instances of self-sacrifice are
relatively rare, yet frequent enough to convince people of their sincerity and efficacy,
they may benefit many or most individuals in a population much of the time.Atran SOM, p. 7
In the case of religiously inspired suicide terrorism, however, these sentiments are
manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters, and trainers to the advantage of the
institution (particularly institutional elites), not the individual. In much the same way, the
pornography, fast food, or soft drink industries manipulate evolved proclivities for
naturally scarce commodities like sexual mates, fatty foods, and sugar to ends that reduce
personal fitness but benefit the manipulating institution. In the present case, such
manipulation is an extreme form of a common practice, in which society’s ruling
management demands readiness-to-die from its own members—and occasional execution
of this demand—as a demonstration of faith in society. In times of crisis, every society
routinely calls upon some of its own people to forfeit their own particular bodies for the
general good of the body-politic. Still, these more common calls to sacrifice usually
allow a glimmer of hope for survival. The psychological distance between willing
acceptance of certain loss of life and possible escape—however unlikely—is the ultimate
measure of devotion that religions typically uphold as ideal (S27).
In sum, both psychosocial (small cells organized under charismatic leadership) and
socio-ecological (unattached males in supportive religious and peer groups) factors shape
the causal network of interconnected representations, emotions, and behaviors that are
broadly characteristic of contemporary suicide bombing. Individual psychopathology,
lack of education, and poverty as such seem not to be significant determining factors,
whereas religious and political context may be decisive. Institutionalized creation of
intimate social cells of willing believers works to canalize ideas (as might a school) and
emotions (as might a church) into proximate causes of actions that lead to attack forms of
martyrdom.. One’s performance in the network of religious and cultural behaviors often
has a complex causal determination that involves any number of variously interrelated
personal and social selection factors (S28). These pertain to the internal environment of
individual ideas and emotions, as well as to external conditions of social and physical
context.Atran SOM, p. 8
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